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REPRESENTATION AND ELECTION: 
THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES 
IN RETROSPECT 
William P. Irwin* 
W HETHER constitutional historians of a later generation will consider the reapportionment cases of 1962-1964 to be as 
important as several contemporary scholars have suggested1 is an 
open question. Not many Supreme Court decisions, of course, are 
rewarded with such an outpouring of comment-both favorable and 
critical-in the journals of law and political science, in the popular 
press, and along the communications networks of concerned. interest 
groups. The very novelty of a reinterpretation of the "political 
question" doctrine,2 especially as it related to the sensitive matters 
of legislative composition and behavior, was bound to excite wide 
and varied response. But one test of the importance of a judicial 
decision must be its long-range influence on the constitutional 
system, and this may or may not be in accord with first speculations. 
There are sound reasons to question not simply whether the political 
impact of the reapportionment decisions will be as momentous as has 
been proposed, but also whether the seeming judicial novelty of the 
cases will remain as the actual political ramifications of the decisions 
are better understood. 
In general, both in the two-year interval between Baker v. Carr8 
and Reynolds v. Sims4 and in the period following the reapportion-
ment decisions of June 1964,5 discussion of the issue among scholars 
and publicists has tended to center upon four problems of varying 
• Professor of Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. B.A. 1947, Hiram 
College; M.A. 1950, Western Reserve University; Ph.D. 1955, University of California 
at Berkeley.-Ed. 
1. Professor McKay stated, for example, that Baker v. Carr is one of "the two most 
important cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in the twentieth 
century." Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 
61 MrcH. L. REv. 645 (1963). Chief Justice Warren himself has assessed Baker v. Carr 
as the most important decision of the Warren Court. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1968, at 1, 
col. 8, 
2. See generally Carrington, Political Questions: The Judicial Check on the Execu-
tive, 42 VA. L. REv. 175 (1956). 
3. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
4. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
5. The cases decided with full opinions after oral argument were the Colorado 
case, Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); the Delaware case, 
Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); the Virginia case, Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 
(1964); the Maryland case, Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 
U.S. 656 (1964); the New York case, WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964), and 
the Alaballla case, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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scope and precision: (1) the jurisdiction of the federal courts to pass 
upon aspects of state legislative apportionment; (2) the justiciability 
of the same matter; (3) the substantive merits of the several cases; 
and, (4) the implications of the decisions for democratic theory and 
practice. No attempt is made here to reopen the argument about 
federal jurisdiction; that question is no longer at issue. The matter 
of justiciability, now seemingly quite settled, is broached only in-
directly in relating the doctrine of "political questions" to the theory 
and process of political representation. Thus, it is to the third and 
fourth of these general questions-to the merits of the reapportion-
ment cases and their likely influence on representation in the Ameri-
can political system-that the following remarks are primarily ad-
dressed. 
I. THE RESPONSE TO THE CASES 
Despite the mixed legal interpretations and sometimes sharply 
conflicting political reactions evoked by the leading reapportion-
ment decisions, it is evident that one or more of three related as-
sumptions unq.erlay most of the commentaries, either explicitly or 
implicitly. These assumptions, which are fundamentally political 
but have direct implications for the law, are (1) that electoral pro-
cedures are the sole, or at least the controlling, measure of representa-
tion in legislative assemblies; (2) that acceptance of an unqualified 
equal-populations standard of legislative apportionment will (for 
better or worse) limit or even preclude the representation of discrete 
interests in legislatures; and, (3) that, by adopting an equal-popula-
tions standard (or, by inference, any constitutional standard) of ap-
portionment, the Supreme Court, justifiably or unjustifiably, 
undertook the task of constructing legislative, deliberative assem-
blies. 6 The fact that the first two of these assumptions have been 
cherished in bipartisan fashion by both friends and critics of the 
reapportionment decisions is more than a matter of passing interest; 
it is an indication of the failure of many of the parties to the reap-
portionment controversy, including the Supreme Court, to relate 
the constitutional issue to the political process. Thus debate has al-
most invariably centered, not upon the relevant empirical question 
of whether enforcement of the "one man-one vote" principle would 
have any impact on the process of legislative representation, but-
assuming that enforcement must have some impact-upon its con-
stitutional propriety. 
6. Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39, 41 (1964). 
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The identification of the electoral system, particularly the man-
ner of apportioning electoral constituencies, as the mechanism that 
controls political representation is rarely explicit, but it occurs so 
frequently as to make the idea seem a truism to the casual reader of 
the recent history and law of legislative reform in the United States. 
It appeared in characteristic form in the Supreme Court dictum that 
"the fundamental principle of representative government in this 
country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people,"7 
as well as in a widely held interpretation of the Court's majority 
opinions in the 1964 reapportionment decisions to mean that "rep-
resentation of all the people is the only permissible objective of an 
apportionment system."8 It was also evident in the statement that 
the "basic issue of these [reapportionment] cases is what kind of 
representation processes and institutions are required to assure a 
government that rests upon the will of the people,"9 and again in the 
declaration that "fair representation is the ultimate goal" that the 
Supreme Court must seek to achieve.10 In one form or another, 
the assumption that representation is defined by, if not indeed 
synonymous with, the electoral device of legislative apportionment 
animated the analysis of the reapportionment decisions in numerous 
articles published both before and immediately after the Reynolds 
decision in 1964.11 "\,,Vhether this assumption is correct is a question 
which cuts to the heart of the theory of representation and is deci-
sive for bringing the reapportionment cases into correct perspective. 
The second assumption-that the equal-populations standard of 
legislative apportionment must restrain, perhaps even bar, the rep-
resentation of discrete interest groups in lawmaking bodies-ap-
peared almost as frequently as the first, and often as a quite explicit 
assertion. This second assumption evidently springs from the first, 
7. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964). 
8. R. HANSON, THE PourICAL THICKET: REAPPORTIONMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 112 (1966). 
9. Kauper, Some Comments on the Reapportionment Cases, 63 MICH. L. REv. 243, 
248 (1964). 
10. Dixon, Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional 
Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. REv. 209, 210 (1964). 
11. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One 
Value, 1964 SUP. CT. REv. 1 (1964); Bickel, supra note 6; Dixon, supra note 10; Israel, 
On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The Future of Baker v. 
Carr, 61 MICH. L. REv. 107 (1962); Kauper, supra note 9; Kurland, The Supreme Court, 
1963 Term-Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Ex-
ecutive Branches of the Government", 78 HARV. L. REv. 143 (1964); Lucas, Legislative 
Apportionment and Representative Government: The Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 
MICH, L. REV. 711 (1963); Mccloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term-Foreword: The 
Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REv. 55 (1962); Sindler, Baker v. Carr: How To 
"Sear the Conscience" of Legislators, 72 YALE L.J. 23 (1962). 
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that apportionment and representation are congruent; it proceeds to 
the logical inference that the representation of types and intensities 
of interest must occur in direct relation to the apportionment of 
quantities of people or votes in the electoral system. Ergo, the 
brief concludes, legislative apportionment according to an equal-
populations standard operating on the principle of "one man-
one vote-one value" must preclude the possibility that interests will 
be represented in legislative assemblies except according to their 
popular numerical weight. This argument was expressed with ele-
mental clarity in the statement that apportionment based on the 
single standard of equal populations "will end centuries of experi-
mentation with the design of democratic institutions which will 
accommodate within the same units of government a wide variety of 
interest groups."12 
The bipartisan appeal of the argument was surprisingly wide. 
Professor Auerbach, for example, was surely correct in observing in 
1964 that much of the immediate opposition to the Baker and 
Reynolds cases resulted from the belief that interests of one sort or 
another are proper objects of legislative representation, and that 
apportionment schemes should therefore be devised to accommodate 
them.18 He might also have observed, however, that most of the 
advocates of apportionment reform in the United States, including 
some of those who welcomed the reapportionment decisions, relied 
on precisely the same implicit assumption that equality of the vote 
will somehow inhibit inequality of representation. The assumed 
competence of the electoral system to control the legislative rep-
resentation of interests is not simply a property of the detractors of 
the reapportionment cases, but has been part of the stock in trade of 
the apportionment reform movement throughout its history. It is 
fundamentally the belief expressed by Justice Frankfurter in his 
dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr,14 but also the grounds upon 
which Professor Auerbach himself chided the dissenters in the 1964 
cases for appealing to the representation of interests.115 
The final assumption, that adoption of a single equal-populations 
standard of legislative apportionment thrust the federal judiciary 
12. Lucas, supra note 11, at 804. The same argument was conveyed somewhat more 
indirectly in the observation that "the principle of equality of individual representation 
can be only a partiai guide to solution of the apportionment problem," Bickel, supra 
note 6, at 41, as well as in the judgment that the principle "may provide an insufficient 
standard of faimess," Sindler, supra note 11, at 24-25. 
13. Auerbach, supra note 11, at 30-39. 
14. 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962), . . 
15. Auerbach, supra note 11, at 30-39. 
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headlong into the political thicket of constructing lawmaking 
bodies,16 is logically dependent, it is argued below, upon the first 
two. Whether the Supreme Court indulged in "judicial prescrip-
tion"17 in the reapportionment cases has been debated too exten-
sively to require citation. The concern that it might do so was 
perhaps expressed most poignantly by Professor McCloskey follow-
ing the announcement of Baker v. Carr but before the decision in 
Reynolds: "[i]t is hard to see how the process of balancing these com-
plexities [of geography, insular minorities, and other interests] could 
be reduced to anything resembling 'an exercise of reason' .... It is 
equally hard to see how the judicial process thus conceived could 
differ from the legislative process ... .''18 
But it would not be hard to see, perhaps, if it were found. 
that the first two assumptions noted above were without theoretical 
relevance or empirical foundation, and that the specter of the "poli-
tical thicket" dissolved without their support. In fact, there are good 
reasons to insist that the processes of election and representation-
that is, the individual act of suffrage within some apportionment 
framework on the one hand, and the social relationship of representa-
tion on the other-are theoretically distinct, politically discon-
tinuous, and constitutionally separable. Every available piece of 
evidence in the long history of parliamentary institutions indicates 
that the representation of interests and interest groups is a con-
tinuing and organic function of legislatures, regardless of electoral 
procedures. This in tum suggests that the most likely effect of the re-
apportionment cases on the legislative process will be simply to create 
a "free market" of interest representation, functioning without 
statutory bias. The reapportionment decisions must eventually be 
related to the process of representation as it occurs in the political 
aystem rather than to the curious but longstanding myth of electoral 
creation of representation. When this is accomplished, it will be 
evident that, far from venturing into the political thicket, the Su-
preme Court intuitively avoided the difficult questions of legislative 
composition and behavior with remarkable prudence. 
II. THE THEORY OF REPRESENTATION 
A major source of confusion throughout the history of debate on 
apportionment reform has been the highly ambiguous use of the 
16. See generally authorities cited supra note 11. 
17, Dixon, supra note 10, at 230. 
18. Mc;Closkey, supra note 11, at 73. 
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term "representative."19 The formal adoption in the United States 
of the title "Representative" in both federal and state constitutions 
indicates the conventional identification of an office with its function, 
of "my Representative" with "my representative." The confusion 
of terms is of no practical consequence, of course, unless it obscures 
the rather obvious fact that my Representative, Senator, or Deputy 
may not be my representative in any positive or personal sense; he 
may, indeed, be actively hostile to my interests or, worse, wholly 
unaware of them. One of the greatest achievements of the parlia-
mentary tradition has been general acceptance of the doctrine that 
authority adheres to the political office, as constitutionally defined, 
and not to its transient occupant. Yet, within the range of accepted 
meanings of the verb "to represent," it is clear that an office, as such, 
is representative of nothing. Rather, it is the officeholder who is rep-
resentative, whether that quality is considered as a personal attribute 
or as one conferred by the nature of his formal position. Whether 
representation occurs as a function of office, as a perceived distribu-
tion of characteristics or interests between two or more persons, or 
as the product of an operative constitutional system, has never been 
resolved to anyone's complete satisfaction in political theory. More-
over, this question was overlooked entirely during the legislative 
apportionment controversy of the 1960's. Whatever the answer may 
be, political representation is certainly not a simple statutory condi-
tion, structured like a crystalline cluster and catalyzed periodically 
by an apportionment scheme in a brief moment of election. Instead, 
the evidence suggests that representation is a process, continuous, 
changing, and influenced by a wide variety of forces of which the 
electoral system is only one. 
Social representation (including political representation) is a 
relationship established by a perceived distribution of character-
istics, interests, or values among people, one or more of whom is 
authorized to act on behalf of others in the relation.20 As a perceived 
distributive relation, representation necessarily involves two or more 
parties, at a minimum the representative and the one represented; 
it is thus social by definition and not something that is "possessed" 
by individuals, groups, or electorates, whether as a right or a dis-
19. The most complete brief compendium of the definitions and theories of rep• 
resentation in the western tradition is found in Fairlie, The Nature of Political Rep-
resentation, 34 AM. PoL. Ser. REV. 236, 456 (1940). 
20. W. Irwin, Political Representation: An Analytic Model (unpublished paper 
delivered at the 1968 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting). See also 
C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 264-66 (rev. ed. 1950); H. 
GOSNELL, DEMOCRACY: THE THRESHOLD OF FREEDOM 206-14 (1948), 
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pensation. The casual use of such phrases as "right of representation" 
and "equal representation" as synonyms for "right to vote" and 
"equal suffrage"-a practice in which the courts, too, have indulged 
from time to time21-suggests that, beyond the citizen's right of 
electoral expression, even beyond his right to equal protection of the 
law, he has a comparable right to equal or proportionate attention 
from the lawmakers themselves. In fact, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that this thought is the essential, though tacit, premise of 
much of the literature of the reapportionment controversy, and the 
principal wellspring from which many of the champions and op-
ponents of equal voting rights have drawn sustenance. 
Attendant to the commonly held idea that political representa-
tion is a fixed condition is the further vague belief that it is, or must 
be made to be, simple and direct, as the relationship seemingly is 
between attorney and client or guardian and ward. In a complex 
organization such as the political system, however, representation 
tends to be multiple and indirect, while the roles of the parties to 
the relationship are frequently interchangeable, ambivalent, or even 
conflicting. Indeed, there are good grounds for concluding that the 
concept of simple and direct representation could never be more 
than a misleading analytic model under any circumstances. Rep-
resentation does not occur in isolation, but within some social con-
text which is continuously influenced by the norms and constraints 
of third parties and the system itself. In the case of the attorney and 
his client, to take the evidently simpler case, the relationship is 
moderated by law, professional standards, custom, and a variety of 
other restrictions introduced by one or the other of the parties or 
their associates. Indeed, it is according to some regularized and 
commonly accepted system of constraints-in law, politics, religion, 
or any other representative relationship-that the function of rep-
resentation establishes its meaning and finds its justification in the 
first place. My representative-my legal counsel or my legislator-
is what he is, not because he responds in simple and direct fashion 
to my wishes and needs, but because he acts responsibly within some 
sort of legalized constitutional framework, that is, a system of norms 
and sanctions which we both accept as relevant and legitimate.22 
21. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559-61 (1964). 
22. The removal of Congressman Adam Clayton Powell from the House of Rep-
resentatives during the 90th Congress illustrates the point with rare clarity. There is 
little question that Powell represented, with intense immediacy, the perceived interests 
of his constituents in the 18th congressional district of New York. Yet the members of 
the House felt obliged (subject, of course, to considerable pressure from their own not 
unbiased constituents) to judge whether his behavior was in conformity with the general 
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There is a difficulty, however, in settling on the truism that a 
representative relationship is subject to systemic influences. The 
statement is plain and for most purposes perfectly adequate; no one 
would question the assertion that a legislator's proper relation to 
his constituents had been corrupted because he accepted a bribe. 
But what is to be said of the legislator who casts his vote contrary 
to the seeming interests of his constituents because he has received 
an appeal from the Governor, his political party, or one of his 
legislative colleagues, all of whom are legitimate participants in the 
constitutional system but are once removed from "the people back 
home" in his district? Certainly there would be little point in argu-
ing in such instances that forces alien to the process of representation 
had somehow confounded its proper execution. Rather, it is evident 
that such third parties are organically present in any representative 
relation and that representation occurs functionally, not just ac-
cording to the simple mechanics of a contractual device such as an 
election system, but as a variable of the whole political process. 
The conclusion that emerges from this brief analysis is that the role 
of the political representative is fashioned within an exceedingly 
complex system, one in which his assessment of himself, of those 
whom he represents, and of the various offices and elements of the 
system itself are all factors affecting his behavior.23 Needless to say, 
the representative's view of any or all of these elements may differ 
from those of his constituents, who in turn may differ widely in per-
ceptions among themselves. Some of the more obvious conditions 
which shatter the myth of simple and direct representation are noted 
at greater length below, although a single example may be cited at 
this juncture. 
Universally among the world's constitutional democracies, po-
litical parties are interposed, in a sense, between electorates and 
parliamentary bodies, not just during campaigns for election, but 
continuously in artd out of legislative sessions. The party is at times 
concretely on hand as a constitutional organ in the representative 
process; at other times, or in other systems, it is present as an attitude 
or commitment which is exhibited in the behavior of both lawmakers 
rules of the game, according to which rules Powell had become a Representative in 
the first place. 
23. A. DE GRAZIA, ESSAY ON .APPORTIONMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 54 
(1963); Eulau, Wahlke, Bachman, &: Ferguson, The Role of the Representative: Some 
Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke, 53 AM. PoL. ScI. REV. 742, 
749 (1959); D. VERNEY, THE ANALYSIS OF PourICAL 5YSFEMS 144-46 (1959). 
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and their constituents. However party functions and powers may 
vary among different political systems, the de facto existence of po-
litical parties must be acknowledged in any meaningful theory of 
representation. It is possible to consider them legitimate representa-
tive organs in their own right, as they have become in British prac-
tice, moderating and shaping, but presumably not corrupting, the 
relation between the people at large and their parliamentary bodies.24 
Or parties may be diagnosed as pathological to the body politic, as 
has often been done in the American tradition, and precautions 
may be taken against them.25 In neither case, however, can the ex-
istence of political parties be reconciled with the simple belief that 
political representation can be a direct legislator-constituent bond 
pledged by arithmetic electoral ratios. Unhappily, this difficulty and 
others of a similar nature have been resolved by most students of 
reapportionment in the United States by simply ignoring them. 
A further aspect of the theory of representation must be noted, 
however, before turning to look at the representative function in 
the American political system. Social representation has been defined 
as a relation in which one or more persons are authorized to act as 
agent or standard of others. I£ the relationship is not a straightfor-
ward and fixed condition between electors and elected, under what 
circumstances can it be said that the exercise of power in a complex 
organization is representative, in the sense of being invested with au-
thority rather than simply arbitrary or dictatorial? As a starting 
point, we can postulate that political power is exercised in a repre-
sentative fashion when all or most of the parties to the relationship 
independently perceive the system which prescribes the use of power 
to be legitimate. This means, in the first place, that it is not only, or 
even necessarily, the particular legislator-constituent ties which sat-
isfy the meaning of representation, but the general political system 
which fashions and justifies those same ties. Our quite detailed 
knowledge of the numbers, intensities, and configurations of elec-
toral interests26 makes it obvious that a legislator could, at best, 
24. D. VERNEY, supra note 23, at 116·20. 
25. The view that the "mischief of faction" must be carefully controlled was force-
fully expressed by James Madison in the The Federalist No. 23 and has been 
echoed over and over again in the Jacksonian, Populist, and Progressive traditions 
of popular democracy. For a thorough historical treatment of the view, see A. DE 
GRAZIA, PUBUC AND REPUBUC (1951), 
26. A. CAMPBELL, P. CoNVERSE, W. MILLER, & 0. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER (1964); 
B. BERELSON, P. UZARSFELD, & w. MCPHEE, VOTING (1954); D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERN-
MENTAL PROCESS (1951); H. ZEIGLER, lNnJmsT GROuPS IN .AMERICAN SOCIETY (1964). 
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"mirror the views"27 or interests of no more than a handful of his 
constituents even if he made a conscientious effort to do so. Yet in a 
stable constitutional system a legislator's representative qualifications 
are called into question only in unusual circumstances, even by per-
sons who voted against him or intensely dislike him. Most of us are 
quite prepared, because of our general confidence that the system is 
legitimate, to accept as our properly elected representatives persons 
who may not be spokesmen for our particular interests. 
But the implicit acceptance of the system means still more. It is 
not the political system per se, let alone a single element of it such 
as an electoral or apportionment arrangement, which supplies au-
thority to the exercise of power; on the contrary, it is a tradition of 
legitimacy, a body of "operative ideals,"28 which lends authority to 
the system and relevance to its detailed procedures. This means, to 
put the matter another way, that formal political representation is 
an element in an operative tradition of constitutionalism, in the 
tradition of exercise of political power according to accepted stan-
dards of consent and restraint.29 If this were not the case, a legis-
lator or other public officer who failed to perform according to the 
conflicting expectations of his constituents, or a Ia-wmaking body or 
procedure which momentarily became "unbalanced" or fell short of 
simulating the apparent character and interests of the electorate, 
would simply be without continuing authority. Without the prior 
assumption of legitimacy, furthermore, there could be no justifica-
tion in the representative system for such practices as electoral or 
legislative majority decision-making, partisan nominations and elec-
tions, partisan organization of legislatures, legislative committee or-
ganization, executive leadership in the legislative process, or even, of 
course, judicial review, all of which are formally "outside" the 
legislator-constituent relationship, and each of which is itself an ap-
portionment device of sorts, structuring, abridging, encouraging, or 
restraining the legislative process. 
"Every electoral system," Professor Mackenzie has aptly remarked, 
27. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, COMMISSION REPORT! 
APPORTIONMENT OF STATE LEGISLATURES (1962), cited in H. HAMILTON, LEGISLATIVE AP-
PORTIONMENT, K.EY TO POWER 121 (1964). 
28. A. LINDSAY, THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE 27-51 (1943). 
29. The concepts of constitutionalism and representation have been clearly inter• 
dependent in their development in the whole period since the twelfth century, as several 
studies have shown. M. CLARKE, MEDIEVAL REPRESENTATION AND CONSENT (1936); Beard 
&: Lewis, Representative Government in Evolution, 26 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 223 (1932); 
Holden, The Imperative Mandate in the Spanish Cortes of the Middle Ages, 24 AM. 
POL. SCI. REv. 886 (1930). 
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"is a sort of confidence trick. [They] only work because we believe 
they are going to work."30 As fundamental as elections have become 
to the existence of constitutional democracy, they are neither more 
nor less than sanctions upon the political system, having the primary 
purposes of eliciting popular consent and providing peaceful con-
tinuity of leadership. They do not have the function of causing rep-
resentation or detailing representative behavior. It is not possible to 
argue-and it is not, of course, the intent to do so here-that elec-
tions bear no political relation to representation; they do so consis-
tently. if quite indirectly, as discussed in the section below. The 
point is, rather, that electoral formulas alone cannot generate a sense 
of legitimacy; on the contrary, it is the sense of legitimacy, sanctioned 
by popular elections, which gives utility and meaning to the concept 
of representation.31 
III. THE PROCESS OF REPRESENTATION 
The process of representation in the American political system-
indeed, in all political systems, most evidently in the constitutional 
democracies-is every bit as intricate as Justices Frankfurter and 
Harlan have argued,32 and far more subtle and interesting than 
many of the advocates of apportionment reform have led us to be-
lieve. Because the reapportionment cases themselves, as well as the 
literature of the reapportionment controversy, refer only to legisla-
tive elections, it is necessary to begin an analysis of the system by 
honoring the nineteenth-century parliamentary fiction that only 
lawmaking assemblies can satisfy the requirements of representative 
govemment.33 How, then, can the role of one political representa-
tive-the legislator-be described to accord with the observed be-
30. Mackenzie, Representation in Plural Societies, in 2 PoL. STUDIES 54, 69 (1954). 
31. S. LIPSET, PoLmCAL MAN 77 (1963): "Legitimacy involves the capacity of the 
system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are 
the most appropriate ones for the society." 
32. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589-625 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 266-340 (1962) (dissenting opinion). 
33. It is one of the more interesting sidelights of the apportionment controversy that 
a reform movement which upheld egalitarian and populist standards of representation 
could applaud such decisions as Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and Lucas v. 
Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964), when the decisions were delivered by 
an agency of government which is hardly representative by those same standards. It 
seems fair to infer that the members of the movement must be willing to assign another 
sort of representative function to the courts. This point illustrates the long-
standing need to reconsider the whole theory of representation, incorporating 
the rather obvious representative functions performed by elected and appointed execu-
tives, the courts, clientele-oriented administrative agencies, political parties, and even 
such quasi-public organizations as community foundations, voluntary health and wel-
fare agencies, chambers of commerce, and so on. 
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havior of lawmaking bodies, and with what appear to be the 
principal influences upon that role? 
In the most general sense, it is the responsibility of the legislator 
to act upon perceived human needs within the framework of certain 
constitutional constraints. Implicit in this statement, however1 are 
four practical considerations which may not be immediately ap-
parent. In the first place, the representative can act, if he acts at all, 
upon only those needs which come to his attention. And many needs 
do not come to his attention-not simply £or lack of communica-
tion, but because "needsu themselves are a matter of definition and 
perception. Second, the representative may perceive human needs 
variously in terms of individuals, functional groups, territorial 
jurisdictions, or ethical certitudes; but because his perceptions 
are rarely recorded publicly, such distinctions are largely moral 
and semantic rather than empirical, and th-µs are not subject to 
statutory determination. Third, the representative's sensibility to 
public needs varies not only according to the numbers of people who 
may have been allotted him by apportionment statutes, but also 
consonant with tµe clarity and intensity with which such needs are 
made known to him, their compatibility one to another, and their 
legitimacy as he sees them in his moral or constitutional universe. 
Finally, the constraints upon any :representative are multiple and 
interrelated, both statutory and political, and extend far beyond 
the immediate electoral and legislative machi11-ery with which they 
are conventionally associated. 
Beyond the logic of the argument, however, the strength of 
evi¢1.ence relating to legislative behavior34 leads to a further con-
clusion, one which has generally been obscured in the theories of 
representation and ignored in judicial interpretation. Because the 
representative is able to act only upon perceived needs, needs which 
in his observation vary by kind, clarity, intensity, and legitimacy, it 
follows that in the process of representation (as distinct from the law 
of elections), a legislator's constituents are effectively defined by a 
?4. J. MATTHEWS, SoCIAL BACKGROUNDS OF PoLmCAL D:ECISION-MAKERS (1954); J. 
WAHLKE, W. BACHMAN,&: L. FERGUSON, THE L:EGISLATIVE SYSTEM: ExPLORATIONS IN LEGIS• 
LATIVE BEHAVIOR (1962):" Chubb, "(Joing Abp.ut Persecuting Civil Servants": The: Role: 
of th(! Irish Parliamentary :fl.epresentative, p Por,.. ~TUDI~ 27~ (1963); Crane, The: 
Errand-Running Function of ,4ustrian Legislators, 15 rARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 160 
(1962); Dowse, Repr(!sentation, General Elections and Democracy, 15 PARLIAMENTARY 
AFFAIRS 331 (1962); Epstein, British M.P.S. and Their Local Parties: The Suez Case:s, 54 
AM. PoL. Sci. R.Ev. 374 (1960); Eulau, supra note 23; Kornberg, Perception and Con-
stittfency Influenc~ on Legislative Behavior, 19 WESTERN Pot. Q. 285 (1966); Miller &: 
Stokes, Constituency Influence: in Congress, ~7 AM. PoL. Sp. REv. 45 (1963); Wahlke, 
Bachman, &: Ferguson, American State Legislators' Role Orientations Toward Pressure 
Groups, 22 J. POL. 203 (1960). 
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pattern of behavior in which both participate-by his identification 
of certain articulate publics and their reactions to one another. 
That the law of elections is a factor in this process is, of course, 
perfectly dear, but it functions as only one of a large number 
of constraints in the representative's psychological world. There is 
no doubt in the legtslator's mind, and certainly no constitutional 
barrier to his understanding, that from one day to the next, and 
even simultaneously, he may be called upon to act on behalf of a 
specified individual, an organized group, a generalized class or cate-
gory of persons (such as the aged or the poor), a district, state, region, 
or nation, and perhaps even some seemingly detached ideal such 
as "national honor." Yet any or none of these influences may be 
directly related to the apparent interests of "the people back home 
in the district." Still he returns to those people periodically, not to 
pose the conundrum of whether he has satisfied the dictates of "equal 
representation," but to seek their consent to his behavior by asking, 
"How am I doing?" This quest for the constituents' general consent 
is not illogical, however, since the legislator knows that their be-
havior is not bounded solely by the territorial and numerical pro• 
visions of the election statutes; it is subject to the same range of 
indefinite and conflicting constraints as his own. 
Therefore, the assumption that any apportionment system-a 
necessary yet quite arbitrary device for choosing members of a legis-
lature-can be the dominant, let alone ruling, force upon legislative 
behavior is as fundamental a misapprehension of the political process 
as it is possible to entertain. It is obvious that apportionment plans 
do affect the legislator; they do so, however, not by arithmetically 
redistributing his sensibilities toward a jurisdiction or the persons 
who reside within it, but by altering his perception of the whole 
political system in a way that would be entirely unpredictable if 
other major factors were not taken into account simultaneously. Far 
from simply reacting to the stimuli of his statutory environment, the 
legislator actively engages in the creation of constituencies and con-
stituent interests-identifying, weighing, selecting, and rejecting 
them, even imputing the existence of needs and aspirations to people 
who cannot speak for themselves. In short, the legislator is affected 
by the law, but he is hardly a creature of it; it is his function to make 
public policy, rather than to attempt to reflect electoral directives 
which, without his prompting, might not even exist in the first 
place. It is this consideration-that a government must in some part 
lead rather than simply follow-that gives meaning and importance 
to elections as the machinery of consent. 
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But, apart from the somewhat abstract outline of the role of 
the representative, attention should be drawn to some of the more 
obvious constraints within the political system (in addition to ap-
portionment) which tend to modify and shape the representative 
relationship between electors and elected. Several of these constraints 
are embedded in the statutes of election and others are found in the 
operating procedures of government, but they all have roughly the 
same significance for the representative process as apportionment, 
and, in a sense, each functions as a de facto apportionment device.31l 
The most evident of the electoral influences upon representation 
are the states' widely varying suffrage provisions for general elections. 
Except in areas where Negroes are still effectively disenfranchised, it 
is generally conceded that these variations no longer present a serious 
problem for state and federal elections in the United States. Yet in 
recent years the Supreme Court has entertained questions of dis-
criminatory impairment of suffrage rights by use of the literacy 
test,36 by congressional and assembly district gerrymandering,37 and, 
in the reapportionment cases themselves, by the arbitrary use of 
place of residence. On purely constitutional grounds, there is no 
reason to assume that the federal courts will not be asked in the 
future to look more closely at voter registration procedures and per-
haps term of residence provisions,38 both of which have been widely 
used for patently discriminatory purposes. 
At the local level these variations are of even greater significance. 
Given the fact that municipalities, school districts, and a variety of 
other special election districts are, according to state constitutional 
35. Dean Neal notes the effects which legislative districting, special-majority elections, 
and the seniority system, among other things, have upon representation, and concludes 
that "equality of voting weight is scarcely any guide to reasonableness or fairness of a 
State's representative plan. As a standard of performance it is about as adequate an 
instrument as would be a ruler for judging a work of sculpture or a metronome a 
symphony orchestra." Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 252 
(1962). I agree that equality of voting weight is not an adequate measure of representa-
tion, but maintain that it is an important constitutional value in itself. The search for 
a "reasonable" or "fair" standard of representation, it seems to me, is the very defini-
tion of "politics in search of law." See A. DE GRAZIA, supra note 23, for an extensive 
catalogue of electoral and legislative procedures which directly bear upon the repre• 
sentative relationship. 
36. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 
145 (1965); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965); Lassiter v. Northampton 
County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
37. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
38. In another context, several cases are now pending before the Supreme Court 
which challenge the constitutionality of requiring a minimum period of residency 
before an individual may participate in state welfare programs. For a report of the 
oral argument of these cases, see 37 U.S.L.W. 3153 (Oct. 29, 1968). 
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standards, "instrumentalities created by the State,"39 there is a 
Pandora's box of potential litigation on questions of statutory dis-
crimination in suffrage on the basis of property ownership, tax lia-
bility, both place and term of residence, literacy, and perhaps other 
lesser known standards.40 Indeed, clarification of one of these poten-
tial issues is already underway. Although the Supreme Court has thus 
far held that the ruling in Reynolds v. Sims is applicable only to 
local government bodies "having general governmental powers"41-
a definition which is by no means clear-it also declared that "single-
member districts of substantially unequal population" for the elec-
tion of local as well as state governments are in violation of the 
equal protection clause.42 The point here is neither to predict nor 
to encourage further litigation of this sort, however justified it may 
be, but simply to make it clear that state, county, municipal, and 
special election districts in the United States are "apportioned," not 
just according to the number of people residing in them, but fre-
quently on the basis of citizens' attainments, mobility, and solvency 
as well. 
Of a similar order, but on a considerably more confused plane, is 
the fact that party nomination procedures are an organic part of the 
electoral process. The Supreme Court has, of course, recognized that 
primary elections may be "an integral part of the election ma-
chinery" and thus are subject to the same public regulation as gen-
eral elections,43 a fact which led Professor Emerson to remark that 
the logic of the reapportionment decisions might apply equally to 
primary elections.44 But nominating caucuses and conventions are 
also integral to the electoral process, and, however remote their pro-
cedures may appear to be from the issue of the reapportionment 
cases, they probably influence the representative process as sig-
nificantly as both primary and general elections. Although the mat-
39. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964). 
40. Compare Cipriano v. City of Houma, 286 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. La. 1968) (property 
tax requirement for voting in a municipal utility revenue bond issue election held 
constitutional even though the utility was to be self-financing) with Pierce v. 
Village of Ossining, 292 F. Supp. 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (property ownership requirement 
for voting in a village election to determine whether to change from a mayoral system 
to a village manager system of government held unconstitutional). 
41. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968). The Court earlier ruled that, 
because a board of education performs "essentially administrative functions" and is 
"not legislative in the classical sense," there is no violation of the equal protection 
clause if the board is appointed or indirectly elected. Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 
U.S. 105, 110 (1967). 
42. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 486 (1968). 
43. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941). 
44. Emerson, Malapportionment and Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J. 64, 70 (1962). 
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ter seems to have little or no judicial relevance, there is no doubt 
that participation in any of the several nominating procedures, a 
privilege typically limited by law to narrow categories of electors, is 
an act-a "vote," if you will-of greater political significance than 
that which is guaranteed to the population at large in general elec-
tions. Obviously, it is also action which has a direct bearing on the 
subsequent outlook and behavior of the elected representative. 
A final example of formal electoral constraints upon representa-
tion is legislative districting, a matter which has come before the 
Supreme Court in several recent cases.45 It is common knowledge, 
of course, that legislative districts can be gerrymandered, altering 
their socioeconomic and partisan characteristics without substantially 
varying the numbers of people within them or distorting their con-
figurations. The relative utility of large and small districts, single-
rriember and multiple-member districts, or demographically homo-
geneous and heterogeneous districts has recently been given some 
attention by political scientists, 46 although no thorough assessment 
of their impact upon the representative relationship has yet been 
made. No great amount of evidence is required, however, to sustain 
the assertion that any of these statutory variables, and in particular 
the use of multiple-member districts, 47 can affect the representative 
behavior of legislative assemblies in much the same way as the nu-
merical apportionment of populations among electoral districts. 
Most of the recent discussion in the United States about the tech-
niques of legislative districting has rested upon the assumption that 
such electoral engineering or "legal gerrymandering" must be un-
dertaken within the limits impos~d by the doctrine of electoral 
equality that the Court elaborated' in the reapportionment cases. 
It is worth noting, however, that several combinations of deliberately 
biased apportionment and legislative districting plans have been 
used for the purpose of increasing the parliamentary representation 
of democratic or centrist political parties in a number of European 
countries;48 such schemes have also been pointedly urged for New 
45. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965); 
Boineau v. Thornton, 379 U.S. 15 (1964). 
46. Hamilton, Some Observations in Ohio: Single-Member Districts, Multi-Member 
Di$tricts, and the Floating Fraction, in H. HAMILTON, REAPPORTIONING LEGISLATURES 73 
(1966); Irwin, Colorado: A Matter of Balance, in M. JEWELL, THE POLITICS OF REAP-
PORTIONi-1ENT 64 (1962); Jewell, Criteria Reflected in Recent Apportionments; in H. 
HAMILTON, REAPPORTIONING LEGISLATURES 14 (1966). 
47. This practice has recently undergone judicial observation. See Lucas v. Forty-
Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); cases cited supra note 38. 
48. General political instability, __ as well as the growing threat of the Communist 
Party following World War II, led France, Italy, and Germany, among others, to adopt 
electoral systems which encouraged the growth of or inflated the number of legislative 
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Zealand49 and tentatively suggested for the United States50 i!S a 
means of assuring a legislative majority to the political party which 
receives a majority of the popular vote. The introduction of any 
such device for the purpose of shifting "some of the emphasis from 
representation as a function of election to representation as a func-
tion of government,"51 is in one respect precluded in the United 
States by the ruling in Reynolds v. Sims; districting to provide 
representation in violation of the equal-populations standard is 
clearly impermissible. However, the state legislatures are perfectly 
aware that there is currently no constitutional barrier, nor is there 
likely to be one in the immediate future, against the manipulation 
of demographic data in the construction of legislative districts that 
satisfy the equal-population principle but still achieve partial modi-
fication of the representative process. 
Although the informal constraints upon the legislator's conduct 
of his office are superficially less evident, they are perhaps of greater 
importance to the representative system than those formal limitations 
just discussed. The most immediate of these constraints is the legis-
lative assembly itself, containing a number of what might be termed 
"internal constituencies." In order to make collegial lawmaking a 
practicable undertaking, it has been universally necessary to adopt 
extensive rules of procedure which, in a sense, apportion the time 
and attentions of the assembly member. More than three-quarters 
of a century ago, Woodrow Wilson pointed out that congressional 
committees tend to assume the qualities of a whole legislative body 
and are frequently dominated by chairmen with undisputed, near-
seats held by their democratic and centrist parties. In France, under the Fourth Re-
public, a scheme of proportional representation was adopted, using a list ballot system 
in large multiple-member districts. Seats were allocated on the basis of highest aveniges, 
a system which reduces the potential impact of small party concentrations in local 
areas. Italy had used a highest-averages proportional representation system for a brief 
period between the wars, but returned to a simple list system in 1948. In 1952, after 
sharp erosion of the electoral base of the Christian Democratic Party, a new law was 
passed which permitted partisan electoral alliances and which provided that any party 
or alliance that polled more than 50% of votes cast in the nation at large would be 
alloted 65% of national assembly seats. Although Germany has altered its electoral 
provisions several times since World ·war II, its basic law of 1953 provides for a 
combination of simple plurality elections in constituencies in which half of the 
Bundestag members are elected, and a highest-averages proportional representation list 
system in a single national constituency, by which means the other half of assembly 
members arc chosen. The effect of this system is to reduce not only the size of marginal 
parties, but the total number of parties as well. W. MACKENZIE, FREE ELECTIONS 85-89 
(1958). 
49. Scott, Gerrymandering for Democracy, 7 POL. SCI. ll8 (1955). 
50. Sindler, supra note ll. 
51. J. HOGAN, Eu:CTION AND REPRESENTATION 183 (1945). 
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dictatorial authority.52 An American lawmaker today is at once a 
member of a whole legislature, one of its houses, one or more com-
mittees and subcommittees, a party caucus or conference, and per-
haps a study commission or two. Each of these organs is an operative 
internal constituency which the member "represents" as a matter of 
duty, deference, or reciprocity.53 The general tendency of American 
legislators to specialize, becoming experts on agriculture or taxa-
tion while deferring to their colleagues on other matters, further 
estranges the_m from the innocent effort to provide "equal representa-
tion to equal numbers of people." In addition to representing a host 
of internal and external constituencies, a legislative body must also 
represent itself, not in order to pursue selfish interests, but to pre-
serve its powers, prestige, and traditions, and to deflect and structure 
the demands of its external constituents. 
Among the external constituencies, finally, are a formidable array 
of organized centers of power and authority, both in and out of 
government, which bring varying degrees of influence to bear upon 
the representative process. The most obvious of these in a presidential 
system of government is, of course, the chief executive. The role 
of independently elected chief executives has never been properly 
considered in the theory of representation, probably because the 
major elements of the theory are European in origin, and thus re-
lated to the experience of parliamentary systems. The point need 
not be pressed, however, that elected chief executives may be looked 
upon as representative figures in their own right; it is sufficient to 
make the commonplace observation that the President, the gov-
ernor, and other elected state executives, as well as the mayor or city 
manager, are dominant powers in the legislative process, often exact-
ing continuous and detailed representation from friends and foes 
alike. In addition, executive departments, departmental bureaus, 
and independent regulatory agencies at all levels of government fre-
quently maintain ex parte representative relationships with indi-
vidual members and committees of legislative bodies.54 Even the 
courts are present in the legislative process, not as active petitioners, 
of course, but as a perceived restraining influence-just as they have 
been in recent- years, for example, in respect to legislative apportion-
ment. 
52. CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 60-84 (1885). 
53. Huitt, The Congressional Committee: A Case Study, 48 AM. PoL. Sex. R.Ev. 340 
(1954). 
54. Getz, Ex Parte Communications: A Study in Legislative Reluctance, 19 WESTERN 
POL. Q. 31 (1966). 
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Too much has been written on the continuing impact of private 
and quasi-governmental interest groups55 on both elections and the 
legislative process to require further elaboration here.56 It is suf-
ficient to indicate that the influence of such groups upon the repre-
sentative process is probably substantially greater than that of any 
electoral device, and that any theory of representation which does 
not take them into account is completely inadequate. 
IV. THE LOGIC OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES 
Of the three assumptions noted at the outset, the first two, it 
seems, can be dismissed as insubstantial. The initial assumption that 
the electoral process, perhaps even the apportionment system alone, 
is the controlling measure of representation in legislative assemblies 
is utterly unfounded. The invention begins with a misconception of 
the meaning and function of the process of representation, ignores 
the great number of additional constraints upon the relationship 
between electors and elected, and, finally, assigns to the electoral 
process the impossible task of generating, rather than supporting 
and sanctioning, the legitimacy of the system. The second assump-
tion, that adoption of an equal-populations standard of legislative 
apportionment will limit or preclude the representation of interests, 
is equally without meaning. It rests, it seems, on the same miscon-
ception of the representative process as the first assumption-that is, 
on the illusion that representation is wholly dependent on the 
electoral process and that the terms of the latter can be made to 
occupy the legislator's attentions fully, immunizing him from other 
influences in the political system. The representation of interests, it 
is safe to predict, will go on apace in the legislatures of the United 
States, just as it has in every parliamentary body in history, how-
ever apportioned. At most, the effect of the constitutional standard 
adopted in the reapportionment cases will be to alter slightly the 
rules of the legislative game, as indicated below. 
But what of the third assumption, that the Supreme Court, by 
entertaining the substantive issue of legislative apportionment, initi-
ated a new and drastic attempt to construct lawmaki~g bodies? On 
first reckoning, it appears that the matter of legislative apportion-
ment is so meager an element in the complex political process of 
representation as to exonerate the Court on the grounds of de mini-
55. Of course, this category includes political parties, discussed in text accompany-
ing note 43-44 supra. 
56. See authorities cited supra notes 26 and 34. 
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mus culpability alone. As Professor Pollack has pointed out, the 
issue of Negro voting rights, which the Court has steadily clarified 
in the thirty-three year period between Nixon v. Herndon51 and 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 58 has in principle a similar, perhaps iden-
tical, relevance for the function of representation as that of appor-
tionment. 59 Certainly the composition and perhaps the behavior of 
American legislative bodies have been modified by these and other 
cases dealing with suffrage rights,60 yet there is no substantial ob-
jection that the courts have tampered with the legislative prerogative 
in any of the~. 
Still, tµe answer to the question of whether the Supreme Court 
has strayed into a politicc1.l thicket must be related to a more funda-
J!len~al consideration than that of the degree of its influence upon 
the political process; it must rest upon the argument-which the 
Court acted upon but did not clearly enunciate in the reapportion-
m~nt d~cisions-that the right of an individual to vote, on the one 
hap.«;!, and the "righf' of a person or interest to representation, on 
the other, belong to essentially different constitutional orders. It is 
the latter order, that of representation, which is the substance of 
the political process: it is the political thicket. For the Supreme Court 
to hc1.ve m.ade any attempt whatever to insure the accommodation 
of any int~rest-geographical, economic, ethnic, partisan, or "his-
torical"-in the legislative process would have catapulted it head-
long into the continuing political questions, not simply of whether, 
but also of which groups are to receive political advantages in the 
legisl<1-tiv~ process. Such questions are at the very heart of public 
policy determination, 
· Yet it is remarkable how frequently the Supreme Court was 
either urged, to do precisely this, or reproached for not having done 
s9. T9 express the hope immediately after Baker v. Carr that the 
S-qprei:µe Court would eventually adopt a standard of "rational 
deviations" from the equal-population principle of apportionment 
in order to provide "repre~entation according to political subdivi-
sions, geographical regions, or functional divisions in the population" 
as a mc1,tter of "reasoned policy,"61 was simply to invite the judiciary 
57. 273 U.S. ·535 (1927). 
58. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
59. Judicial Power and "The Politics of the People," 72 YALE L.J. 81, 83 (1962). 
?rofe~or Pollack's remarks are particularly perceptive inasmuch as they preceded the 
decisions of 1964. 
60. See Harper -y. Virginia :Sd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 543 (1964); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v: Allwright, 321 U.S. 
649 (1944). 
61. Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The Future 
of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REv. 107, 134 (1962). 
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into the political thicket. To propose late in 1962 that the Court 
consider both area representation and some means "of assuring 
significant legislative representation to the minority party in urban 
areas"62 was to issue the same perilous invitation. Or to maintain 
following the 1964 apportionment decisions that the Court had 
ignored such considerations as "effective majority rule" and the 
permanent underrepresentation of minorities, and that it must in 
the future take them into account, 63 was not only to misconstrue 
the meaning of the reapportionment cases themselves, but also to 
entice the Court into the very political morass which virtually every-
one agreed in principle that it should avoid. 
There is an enduring democratic appeal, of course, in proposals 
which seek to guarantee to electoral or partisan majorities a propor-
tionate influence in legislative assemblies or to apportion the vote 
in such a way as to accommodate urban areas or racial minorities, 
which have certainly suffered legislative indignities in the past. But 
what standard is available to the Supreme Court as a constitutional 
test of "rational deviations" from equal suffrage in legislative ap-
portionment? What is the measure of the validity of any particular 
claim to legislative attention which may be brought fonvard by a 
racial, ethnic, or cultural group, by a political jurisdiction, an in-
dustrial association, a fraternal society, or even, as Professor Dowse 
asks,64 by a birdwatchers club? 
Among the various "geographic interests" whose virtues have 
been debated throughout the history of the apportionment reform 
movement, which of them is the most reasonable? What, for example, 
is the "rural interest"? Whatever its substance may have been in the 
formative years of the Republic, there is little doubt that its meaning 
has varied sharply in the United States from one regional economy 
to another and from one era to the next; today it is the mixed voices 
of urban-based extracting and processing industries, businessmen 
in small cities, and the more highly organized and conservative farm 
producer groups, all of whom find the wistful memory of our agrarian 
past congenial to their present interests. It is probably the case, 
moreover, that political overrepresentation of the so-called rural 
interest in state legislatures did not generally result from malappot-
tionment, but instead directly caused it. It required political man-
agement of a high order, not only to impose unequal apportionment, 
62. Sindler, Baker v. Carr: How To "Sear the Conscience" of Legislators, 72 YALE 
L.J. 23, 29-30 (1962). 
63. See Dixon, Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional 
Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. R.Ev. 209 (1964). 
64. Dowse, supra note 34, at 336. 
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as happened in Ohio in 1902 and in Colorado in 1962, but also to 
sustain it when it resulted from population shifts, as was the case in 
Tennessee and Alabama. There is little likelihood, under the cir-
cumstances, that the directive of the reapportionment cases will rad-
ically alter the structure of political skills and power that are opera-
tive in the state legislatures. 
Moral or political considerations aside, there were simply no 
available constitutional grounds upon which the Supreme Court 
could have responded to the plea of one interest rather than an-
other in the reapportionment cases. Accordingly, there was only one 
course available to the Court-a course which took into considera-
tion the fact, evident beyond any shadow of a doubt, that the votes 
of some people were not equal in weight to the votes of others under 
the apportionment schemes of most of the states, but a course which 
also honored the standing injunction against judicial intervention 
in "political questions." That course was to act upon the suffrage 
question in isolation, asserting once again the constitutional right 
of each citizen to participate equally in the electoral process without 
reference to whether any citizen or his interest would come to the 
subsequent attention of a legislature. And it was precisely this, no 
more, that the Supreme Court accomplished in the reapportionment 
cases, despite the frequent ambiguity and extravagance of its lan-
guage. 
In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court observed: "Undeniably the Con-
stitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified citi-
zens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections .... "65 "[T]he right 
to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice," it went on to say, "is 
of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that 
right strike at the heart of representative government. And the right 
of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight 
of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free 
exercise of the franchise."66 Thus, as stated in the Court's own words, 
the core of the matter is that "the weight of a citizen's vote cannot 
be made to depend on where he lives."67 
In Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly68 this judgment was 
elaborated: "[A]n individual's constitutionally protected right to cast 
an equally protected vote cannot be denied even by a vote of a 
majority of a State's electorate .... A citizen's constitutional rights 
65. 377 U.S. at 554. 
66. 377 U.S. at 555. 
67. 377 U.S. at 567. 
68. 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
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can hardly be infringed simply because a majority of the people 
choose that it be."69 In summary, the reapportionment cases declared 
that the right to vote is "individual and personal"70 and cannot be 
infringed by the act of a majority or impaired by the accident of resi-
dence, regardless of whether the purpose of the apportionment 
scheme is to achieve a balance of geographic interests, to accommo-
date sparsely settled areas, to nourish any special group or interest, 
to establish easily served electoral districts, or even to honor political 
tradition. Only the use of political subdivisions, such as counties, 
may for quite practical reasons be admitted as technical deviations 
from the equal-populations standard of legislative apportionment.71 
Frequently, to be sure, the Supreme Court has lapsed into the 
somewhat allegorical language which has colored public debate on 
legislative reform for generations-a fact that is not particularly 
surprising when it is recalled that the same confusions have been 
entertained by those on all sides of the debate. Thus, the Court 
resorted to using such phrases as "equal representation" and "the 
right of equal representation," sometimes quite categorically, as in 
the observation on its earlier opinion in Wesberry v. Sanders72 "that 
'our Constitution's plain objective' was that 'of making equal repre-
sentation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal ... .' "73 
It was not, of course, by any word or hint "our Constitution's plain 
objective" to guarantee equality of representation; in fact, there is 
every evidence to the contrary. On the other hand, it was a plain 
objective of the Constitution's draftsmen, as Professor McCloskey 
has pointed out,74 to found the constitutional system upon the tradi-
tion of popular consent, and, with the passage of time, it has become 
a further constitutional objective to make the process of consent 
universal. 
On other occasions the Court indulged in such appealing dicta 
as the remark that, "[l]ogically, in a society ostensibly grounded on 
representative government, it would seem reasonable that a majority 
of the people of a State could elect a majority of that State's legisla-
69. 377 U.S. at 736-37. 
70. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964). 
71. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580-81 (1964); Vigneault v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 237 N.E.2d 286 (Mass. 1968); Recent Development, Reapportionment 
-Legislative Bodies-Signaficant Deviation from Standard of Substantial Population 
Equality of State Legislative Districts Is Permissible To Provide Representatives for 
Two Island Counties, 67 MICH. L. R.Ev. 587 (1969). 
72. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
73. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559-60 (1964). 
74. McCloskey, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term-Foreword: The Reapportionment 
Cam, 76 HARV. L. R.Ev. 55, 71 (1962). 
Michigan Law Review [Vol, 67:7'i!J 
tQr~. "71i It d9~s s~em re~spnable, to be ~ure, put it bears no necessary 
glatiop. to the issue 9f equal suffrage, as Professor Lucas has cor-
rectly ~oted.76 A popul~r i:p.ajority can be guaranteed a legislative 
majority, in fact, only by prescribing the character of that majority 
(by nµmber, jurisdiction, party, interest, or any combination of such 
GOJ1Sjderati<;ni~) arn;l thereafter, by biasing electoral procedures to as-
~m;~ t4€;! <;lesir(;!d outcome. And once so difficult a task is undertaken, 
as several European nations have learned since World War II, there 
still can be no guarantee that the interests of that popular majority, 
however they may b~ defined, will be represented. 
In the final analysis1 a11-d despite its sometimes distracting digres-
sions, the Supreme Court did no more-but certainly no less-in 
the reapportion~ent c<1-ses than add a further and remarkably cau-
ti9µs dimension to the almost universally conceded right of each 
citiien to vote. While 9nly "qualified" citizens may vote, the Court 
held (reserving judgment on remaining suffrage limitations), the 
Constitution cannot permit impairment of the vote on the accidental 
basis of place of residence. It is difficult to see how Baker v. Carr 
could in the future be held to be anything more or less than Pro-
fessor Black, in l962, insisted that it was: a single, clear holding that 
the Gourt had been mistaken in Colegrove v. Green,77 and that the 
complaint was in fact one of "dilution of the plaintiffs' votes."78 It 
is also hard to see how the reapportionment decisions of 1964 could 
be c9nstrued by ~ later generation of scholars in any other light than 
that which Professor E~erson cast upon them in a remarkable act 
of anticipation late in 1962: "The fact that the Court [in Baker v. 
Carr] was dealing with the right to vote, a fundamental and special 
area, indicates that one sh9uld perhaps not make too much of this 
new use of the equal protection clause."79 
Happily, the Court did n9t turn t9 a widely accepted formula-
tior:i o~ the issu~ as being a problem of 1'£<1-ir representation."80 Quite 
apart from the judgment, stated above, that representation and 
suffrag~ are at one(;! distinct concerns of political theory and only 
indirectly related in the political process, it would be hard to imagine 
an adjective more imprecise and political in nature than "fair." The 
Court looked instead to the patently justiciable and quite objective 
75. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 553, 565 (1964). 
76. Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and Representative Government: The Mean· 
ing of Baker v. Carr, 61 M1cH. L. REY. 711, 772 (1963). 
77. 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
78. Black, Inequities in Districting for Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colegrr,JVe v. 
Green, 72 Y...µ.E L.J. 13. 
79. Emerson, supra note 44, at 65. 
80. E.g., Dixon, supra note 63, at 210. 
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constitutional issue of equal suffrage, establishing an additional 
precedent in cases which should be interpreted-indeed, will in time 
be interpreted-as voting rights cases having little or no relevance 
to the legislative process. 
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES 
Two further questions should be touched upon briefly. What 
will be the likely influence of the reapportionment decisions on 
legislative behavior after the present period of reapportionment and 
redistricting is substantially complete? And, what is the logical ex-
tension of these cases for possible future judicial determination? 
To the extent that apportionment systems act as constraints on 
the process of representation (an extent minimized above), the 
withdrawal of all statutory bias in favor of any political group or 
interest will tend to foster a "free market" of representation in 
which individuals, groups, geographical areas, and other interests 
can command legislative attention on a legally random basis. Whether 
such an outcome is desirable is a question that is likely to be debated 
at length as it becomes clear that the reapportionment cases will have 
little or no bearing on the legislative response to any particular 
political issue such as the social and economic equality of Negroes 
· or the elimination of poverty. The effect of such a representative 
free market, as in all free markets, will be to give greatest advantage 
to those who possess the greatest political skills and resources-that 
is, to the established, the prosperous, and the least scrupulous.81 It 
will provide roughly the same political advantage as the previous 
legislative market provided to any group or coalition of interests 
which possessed the power to exact favored legislative treatment, 
including, it should be noted, the coalition that supported or im-
posed inequality of the vote in the first place. 
Finally, contrary to the suggestion that the federal courts must 
now attend to such aims as "effective majority rule" or the repre-
sentation of minorities,82 the logic of the reapportionment cases 
seems to be otherwise. The likelihood is, in fact, that the Supreme 
Court has limited its future ability to weigh such political ques-
tions, not so much as a result of its reformulation of the doctrine 
of political questions, but because of its defense of a purely "in-
dividual and personal" standard of invidious discrimination in suf-
frage provisions. The logical extension of the cases, then, appears 
81. Dowse, supra note 34, at 332. 
82. E.g., Dixon, supra note 63. 
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to be toward a further clarification of the meaning of the right 
to vote as that question may arise with respect to primary elections, 
elections in local jurisdictions such as counties and municipalities, 
or alleged discrimination in voting on the basis of term-of-residence 
standards, property requirements, or, possibly, voter registration pro-
cedures. But how many of these electoral questions will be examined 
in the courts in the future is still another political question. 
